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Abstract
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the poorest countries in the World.
The construction sector will play an essential part to bring the country on the path of
economic growth, and competition within the sector is crucial to achieve this goal. In this
paper we analyze the eﬀect of competition in public works tenders in the DRC. Using a
unique and newly assembled database on tenders we ﬁnd that the number of participating
bidders and the observed spread of submitted bids both signiﬁcantly reduce contract prices,
conﬁrming our prior that competitive pressure can enhance the overall performance of the
sector.
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1 Introduction
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the largest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,
both by land area and by population. DRC is also the second poorest country of the world as
of 2010. After the “lost decade” of war in the 1990’s the country is now politically (fairly) stable
and on a path to economic recovery. It has tremendous natural resources and an essentially
untapped agricultural potential (Herderschee et al., 2011).
The construction sector will play an essential part to bring DRC back on the path of
economic growth, via its own contribution to GDP, but more importantly as it may act as the
catalyst for growth in other sectors. Basic infrastructure in DRC is in a state of despair. For
example, agricultural products can often not be transported to the main urban areas let alone
be exported. Similarly, the country presents a vast demand for productive facilities as well as
for private housing.
Alas, given the current performance of the sector, it will rather be a bottleneck hindering
economic recovery for years to come. Starting 2010, as part of the World Bank’s Country Eco-
nomic Memorandum (CEM) for DRC, a sectorial study of construction services was undertaken
(Herderschee et al., 2011). The main ﬁndings of this study were: i) the sector is heavily concen-
trated. Most large infrastructure projects are undertaken by two international (Chinese) ﬁrms
and only two local companies operate nationwide. Alongside, there exist a multitude of small
and medium enterprises, many of them in a precarious ﬁnancial situation. ii) Most ﬁrms lack
the proper capabilities to successfully manage a project, which leads to a situation where donor
organizations have to provide project management services. iii) There is an important lack of
qualiﬁed labour, further no oﬃcial and credible signal for speciﬁc human capital exists. Workers
are usually hired by some connection to the company or are trained on the spot, without any
supporting infrastructure for training. iv) Cement, a major construction input, is also a heavily
concentrated sector and prices are among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.
In this paper we look at one speciﬁc aspect of the construction sector in DRC. Does com-
petition in public works tender have a price reducing eﬀect? For this we avail of a newly
assembled database on tenders for public construction projects. We measure the competitivity
of a tender by two variables: the number of total bidders and the observed spread of submitted
bids. Further, we are able to control for unobservables via an array of ﬁxed eﬀects. We ﬁnd the
number of ﬁrms submitting a bid signiﬁcantly reduces the contract’s price, while the number of
(presumably on technical grounds) qualiﬁed ﬁrms does not. Similarly, the spread of submitted
bids signiﬁcantly reduces contract price.
The reminder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy present the construc-
tion sector in DRC, focusing on market structure. Section 3 reviews the literature on the eﬀects
of competition on tender prices and possible ways to measure the degree of competition. In
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section 4 we present the data set and the empirical estimation strategy. In Section 5 we present
and discuss the result. Section 6 concludes.
2 Market Structure in DRC’s Construction Sector1
Construction is an important sub-sector within the DRC economy. In 2008 construction and
public works represented roughly 8% of GDP. This accounts for about two thirds of output
from the secondary sector. In the beginning of the decade construction and public works were
also important contributors to economic growth. Indeed in the period 2000-2006 the growth
rate of the sub-sector was considerably above overall GDP growth (see Figure 1). However,
growth has slowed down and reached levels comparable to the overall economy in recent years.
It is diﬃcult, i.e. impossible, to obtain reliable information on market participation and
market shares for the overall construction sector. The information that is available is taken
from a report on road construction (Alliez, 2009). Table 1 presents the most important road
construction companies operating in the country, indicating the city of their headquarters,
average annual sales and market shares. Since most of these companies operate as general
contractors, arguably this table gives a good approximation of market structure in the sector.
Average annual sales of the 15 companies listed in Table 1 are about US$130 million. It
becomes clear from the table that the sector is heavily concentrated. The two most important
ﬁrms in the country concentrate almost half of sales. The C4 concentration ratio is 75%,
and, based on the sample, the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl Index (HHI) is 1615.2 However, the
information on the local companies leaves out an important actor in the construction sector,
i.e. two international ﬁrms. Alliez (2009) estimates that over the period 2009-2013 roughly
65% of road construction will be concentrated among them. Given the important amounts
these projects represent we can proceed to a revised estimate of market concentration. We
assume that the international ﬁrms represent currently about 50% of the market. Hence the
estimated overall C4 ratio amounts to (50% + 48%/2)=74%. If we assume market shares of
30% and 20% for the large competitors we obtain a HHI of 1704. In light of this information, we
would argue that it is fair to say that the construction sector in DRC is heavily concentrated,
likely giving raise to the negative consequences often observed from lack of competition.
Most of the funding for public infrastructure projects is provided by multi- and bilateral
donor agencies, as the government of DRC lacks the proper resources to carry out such projects.
Contracts are awarded almost exclusively via ﬁrst-price tenders, i.e. eligible ﬁrms can submit
bids for speciﬁc contracts and the project is awarded to the lowest bidder. The two main
1This section draws on the report prepared for the CEM.
2Note that the European Commission merger guidelines presume competitive concerns in industries with an
HHI above 2000.
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agencies carrying out these tenders are the Bureau Central de Coordination (BCECO) and the
DRC branch of the United Nations Oﬃce for Project Services (UNOPS). BCECO is part of the
DRC Ministry of Finance, while, as the name suggests, UNOPS is under the direct supervision
of the United Nations.
3 Literature Background
The methodological basis of our analysis lies within auction theory. A recent survey of theo-
retical aspects of auction theory is given in Klemperer (1999). We focus on two aspects that
guide the empirics: competition via the number of participants in the tender and issues of
asymmetries.
Standard theory implies that more participants increase competition and hence lower price.
For example, take the basic Cournot model of oligopolistic competition where the price ap-
proaches marginal cost as the number of ﬁrms in the market increases. Thus, in a procurement
auction context, this competition eﬀect, implies that a higher number of bidders, ceteris paribus,
reduces the price paid for the contract. However, increasing the number of participants can
also lead to higher equilibrium prices: the winner’s curse eﬀect.3
Thus, if the winner’s curse eﬀect overcomes the gains given by the competition eﬀect, the
ﬁnal output would imply higher contract prices paid by the auctioneer. For example, Bulow
and Klemperer (2002) highlight that, in a common-valuation setting, the higher the number of
bidders the lower the selling price.4 An increase in the number of bidders makes the winner’s
curse greater, thus competitors should adjust their bids by reducing the actual oﬀer.
The other important aspect in the context of the construction sector in Congo is the pres-
ence of asymmetric participants. Traditionally, auction theory has considered that buyers are
symmetric ex ante. As mentioned by Maskin and Riley (2000) this can be interpreted as if
the preference parameters of the bidders (i.e. their “types”) were drawn from a symmetric joint
probability distribution. In such a context, all bidders would apply the same equilibrium strat-
egy as a function of their type. In other words, “each potential contractor has essentially the
same information about the nature of the project but a diﬀerent opportunity cost of completing
it”.5 In particular, Maskin and Riley (2000) shows that if a fringe bidder faces a global bidder
rather than another weak bidder, she responds with a more aggressive bid distribution in the
sense of stochastic dominance. Similarly, if a strong bidder faces a weak bidder rather than
3The winner’s curse in an auction context is a situation where a participant is overly optimistic about the
costs to be incurred ending up underestimating them.
4In a procurement auction setting this would imply an increase of the contract price given by a higher number
of bidders.
5Maskin and Riley (2000), p. 414.
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another global bidder, she responds with a less aggressive bid distribution. However, as men-
tioned above, ﬁrms in DRC are very heterogeneous. This goes from important variances in size
and hence the potential of exploiting economies of scale and scope to many ﬁrms lacking proper
management experience and ﬁnancial resources to bring an awarded contract to completion in
time and cost. Conceptually, this situation is best modelled via an asymmetric information
set among the participants and is usually empirically tackled by controlling for (cost) asym-
metries.6 Therefore, a higher spread of bids should be an indicator of cost heterogeneity. In a
procurement auction context; a higher uncertainty, less information or less managerial experi-
ence could lead new entrants to underestimate costs and, therefore, bid too aggressively. In this
case, a large spread of bids could not be reﬂecting the true heterogeneity of bidders’ costs but
the underestimation of costs by fringe participants. Such a scenario would obviously increase
the winner’s curse eﬀect. In other words, for the spread of bids to have a positive impact on
competition, a sound system of pre-selection must be implemented in order to avoid the winer’s
curse eﬀect to overcome the competition eﬀect (De Silva et al., 2003).
Procurement auctions have been the focus of vast empirical research in recent years. for
example, Gupta (2002) studies the eﬀect of competition in highway construction tenders in
Florida. He ﬁnds a negative eﬀect of the number of participants on the procurement price.
Further, he explores at what number of bidders entrants do not have an eﬀect on the price
anymore and ﬁnds that a tender becomes competitive with about eight bidders.
Similarly, Estache and Iimi (2010) use data on multi and bilateral development projects
and ﬁnd that a higher number of participants decreases procurement costs and that competitive
tenders are achieved with about seven bidders in the road and water sectors. Nevertheless, they
ﬁnd that if, for instance, the number of global bidders is large enough, the auctioneer might
have interest in excluding some of the smaller bidders.
De Silva et al. (2003) analyze diﬀerences in bidding behavior by incumbent and entrant ﬁrms
in the road construction set using a dataset of tenders in Oklahoma. The idea behind their
analysis is that new entrants may face higher uncertainty, may have access to less information
and less managerial experience than incumbent ones. Thus, the dispersion in costs estimates
may be larger for them than for incumbent bidders. In addition, the uncertainty given by the
presence of entrant ﬁrms may aﬀect the bidding conduct of incumbents bidders. They ﬁnd that
the number of participating bidders decreases the price for the contract, hence a price reducing
eﬀect of competition. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that new entrant bidders bid more aggressively
and win auctions with signiﬁcantly lower bids than incumbent ones.
Elmaghraby (2005) questions the commonly held belief that increasing the number of bid-
ders decreases procurement costs and, thus, makes the auction more competitive. His main
6See for example Elmaghraby (2005).
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conclusion states that “more bidders is not always better”.7 For instance, he states that if the
number of global bidders is large enough to encourage competition among them, an auctioneer
might want to exclude fringe bidders because global bidders usually bid aggressively in the
presence of small ones (particularly when the number of global bidders is small and the ﬁxed
set-up cost - that is common to all players and is incurred only once - is large).
Finally, Iimi (2009) looks at infrastructure procurement in sub-Saharan Africa. His focus
is on cost overruns and delays, an important problem in public works in Africa and other
developing areas, and the eﬀect of ex-post adjustments on bids. He ﬁnds that a higher number
of participants in the tender increases the price for the procurement contract. Thus, it seems
that in his dataset, the winner’s curse eﬀect outweighs the competition eﬀect. Further, he
instruments the number of bidders as it could be endogenously determined with the submitted
bids. He uses the number of qualiﬁed ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms that have met all the requirements to
participate in the tender, as an instrument. Arguably there are issues with this instrument as
the number of participating bidders is a strict subset of the number of qualiﬁed ﬁrms. In our
application, rather than using the number of qualiﬁed bidders as an instrument, we use it as
an alternative explanatory variable.
Based on these considerations, in order to estimate the eﬀect of competition on tender
prices the main determinants are the number of participants in the auction and, potentially, the
presence of cost heterogeneities. For both variables the overall eﬀect is theoretically ambiguous,
and hence their sign and magnitude remain an empirical matter. To which we now turn.
4 Data and Estimation
We have assembled a new database of public works tenders in DRC. Data was assembled from
the oﬃces of BECECO and UNOPS. The unit of observation is the lot as some tenders are
divided into several lots. We avail of a total of 107 lots. The data is described in more detail
in Jametti et al. (2012)
Data assembly and reliability are notoriously diﬃcult in Africa. As such we had to concen-
trate our eﬀorts considerably. Projects included concentrate on construction of public buildings
and road works, in order to increase the comparability among projects. Tenders from the BE-
CECO oﬃces are from the years 2004 to 2006 while the ones from UNOPS are from 2008 to
2010. Geographically eight provinces are represented. Table 2 illustrates the distribution of
tenders by province. Further, we distinguish seven types of construction projects.8
The information contained in our database includes, besides the type of project and the
7Elmaghraby (2005), p. 1774.
8These are: public building (52 projects), schools (28), road work (5), hospitals and others (6), housing (10),
markets (3), water (3).
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province: the (negotiated) contract price, the number of participating bidders, the number of
qualiﬁed bidders and the bid submitted by each qualiﬁed participant.9 We used this information
to construct the following variables which we use in the empirical analysis.
Contract price is the ﬁnal negotiated price of the tendering lot. Note that in principle this
corresponds to the lowest bid, as all tenders are ﬁrst price tenders conditional on being qualiﬁed
on technical grounds. However, ﬁrms often renegotiate contracts after having won them. Indeed
in our sample, the contract price is higher than the lowest bid (=winning company) in 37%
of the observations (39 out of 107). As dependent variable, in order to make projects more
comparable across observations, we constructed a relative price variable, contract percentage,
which is deﬁned as the ratio between the contract price and the mean of submitted bids. The
number of bidders is the total count of companies that participated in the tender. Further,
qualiﬁed bidders is the number of ﬁrms that are retained as being qualiﬁed to participate. In
principle ﬁrms should be disqualiﬁed only on technical grounds. Finally, we deﬁne spread of
bids as the diﬀerence between the second lowest and the highest bid as a percentage of the
contract price. We choose the second lowest bid for spread in order to avoid mechanical reverse
causality problems. Table 3 presents summary statistics of our variables. The average contract
price is about MUS$1, ranging from slightly less than US$3500 to MUS$15.5. Interestingly,
the contracting price is sometimes higher than the mean of bids, which is illustrated by the
unexpected maximum of contract percentage larger than one. Indeed, inspection of the data
showed that there are ﬁve (5) observations like this. The average number of bidders was about
10, ranging from 3 to 35 participants. However, only about half the participants (5) were
qualiﬁed and entered the competition. Note that in two observations only one bidder survived.
Finally, there is important variation in the spread of bids, ranging from 0 (for observations
where only one bidder survived) to more than 16. This latter values implies that the maximum
bid is up to 16 times higher than the lastly negotiated contract.
Our regression equation is
contract percentagei = α + β1biddersi + β2spreadi + FE + ui, (1)
where bidders is, alternatively, the number of total bidders and the number of qualiﬁed
ones and FE are a number of ﬁxed eﬀects. Indeed within our database we cannot control
for other variables that might explain diﬀerences in contract prices. Instead, we are able to
control unobserved variation via the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects. In all our equations we include
type eﬀects to control for cost diﬀerences across projects of various nature. In our preferred
speciﬁcation we also include time and province eﬀects. Arguably, we are thus able to control
9Unfortunately we were unable to assemble any information on the extent of works to be carried out. Thus,
we cannot perform any unit cost analysis (e.g. cost per kilometer of road).
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for most of the relevant unobservables.
We estimate the above equation using OLS with clustering at the level of project types. Fur-
ther we estimate the regressions using the log of bidders to allow for a diminishing competitive
eﬀect with a large number of bidders.
5 Results and Discussion
Table 4 presents our results. Columns (1) and (4) are our base speciﬁcations, the latter using
log(bidders). In these regressions only project type eﬀects are included. We observe a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10%-level) eﬀect of the number of bidders on the contract
price. This suggests that competition in the bidding project indeed works by lowering negotiated
ﬁnal prices. We also ﬁnd a negative and statistically highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of the spread of
bids on the ﬁnal price.
Columns (2) and (5) present our preferred results including, besides the project type eﬀects,
also time and province eﬀects. The base results are conﬁrmed and actually slightly stronger.
We are able to estimate precisely a negative competition eﬀect, slightly smaller in magnitude
than in the base regression. Similarly, the eﬀect of spread remains unchanged, indicating that
lager variation in the submitted bids actually lowers the ﬁnally negotiated price.
Finally, columns (3) and (6) present a robustness check, where we include the number of
qualiﬁed bidders instead of the total number of participants. Note that this variable is not
signiﬁcant in our speciﬁcations. Thus, what seems to matter in our dataset is the overall
participation rate. The number of qualiﬁed ﬁrms based on technical grounds does not seem to
be the adequate measure for competition.
Although these results are signiﬁcant and robust, their magnitude is rather small. Looking
at the competition eﬀect using our preferred regression (column (2)), we can infer that a one
standard deviation increase in the number of bidders would increase the contract percentage
by roughly 2.4%. Evaluating this at the mean of contracts, this implies that increasing the
number of participants by seven (7) would lead to average reductions of about $20’000 per
project. Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation on the spread of bids (implying that
the largest bid would almost double) reduces the contract percentage by approximately 8%.
6 Conclusion
The construction sector will play a crucial role in future economic growth of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). Both public and private sector demand for construction in the
country is immense. One base for economic relaunch will be a well functioning construction
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sector. In this paper we empirically investigate the eﬀect of competition on public works tenders
in a newly assembled database for projects in most areas of DRC between 2004 and 2010.
We measure competitive pressure by the number of bidders participating in each project as
well as the observed spread of submitted bids. Further, we are able to control for unobserved
variation using a number of ﬁxed eﬀects.
We ﬁnd that the number of participating bidders, rather than the number of qualiﬁed ones,
aﬀects signiﬁcantly and negatively the obtained contract price. Thus, competition works and
has a price reducing eﬀect, although rather small in magnitude. Interestingly, the spread of
bids also has a negative eﬀect on prices. Hence, participation of fringe bidders, although with
potentially higher costs, appears to increase the competitive eﬀect of tenders.
Based on these results, public tender organizers, in our case BECECO and UNOPS, should
incentivize the participation of a larger number of bidders for each project. These fringe bidders
exerce competitive pressure on the incumbents, even if they might be disqualiﬁed on technical
grounds and present potentially higher costs.
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Table 1: Market Shares of Main Local Construction Companies
Company Name City Avg Sales (2003 - 2008) M US Market Shares
EGMF (Enterprise Generale Malta Forrest) Lubumbashi 32.0 24.90%
Safricas Kinshasa 30.0 23.35%
MW Afritec Kinshasa 20.0 15.56%
Number One Contractors Kinshasa 14.0 10.89%
Bego Congo Kinshasa - Kisangani 8.0 6.23%
Sefoco Ingende 6.0 4.67%
AVC Construct Kinshasa 3.0 2.33%
Const Soco (Groupe Ledya) Kinshasa 3.0 2.33%
Enterprise Fretin Matadi 3.0 2.33%
Safrimex Kinshasa 3.0 2.33%
FS Parisi Kinshasa 2.0 1.56%
INCC Lusambo 2.0 1.56%
BACOM Kinshasa 1.5 1.17%
ADI Construct Kinshasa 0.5 0.39%
Batech Kinshasa 0.5 0.39%
(Alliez, 2009)
Table 2: Distribution of Tenders by Province and Source
Province BECECO UNOPS Total
Bandundu 0 9 9
Bas Congo 0 6 6
Equateur 0 3 3
Katanga 0 4 4
Kinshasa 30 9 39
Nord-Kivu 0 11 11
Orientale 0 9 9
Sud-Kivu 0 26 26
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Contract Price 987.98 3234.46 3.435 15493.24 107
Total Bidders 10.13 7.2 3 35 97
Qualiﬁed Bidders 4.95 2.94 1 18 100
Spread 0.91 1.70 0 16.17 104
Table 4: Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tot Bidders -0.004* -0.003***
(0.002) (0.001)
Spread -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.043** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.044**
(0.002) (0.008) (0.015) (0.002) (0.009) (0.017)
Qualiﬁed Bidders -0.000
(0.004)
l(Tot Bidders) -0.043* -0.022**
(0.018) (0.006)
l(Qualiﬁed Bidders) 0.008
(0.035)
Constant 0.851*** 0.866*** 0.819*** 0.897*** 0.884*** 0.803**
(0.018) (0.138) (0.184) (0.037) (0.140) (0.219)
R2 0.302 0.403 0.436 0.296 0.399 0.436
N 94 89 92 94 89 92
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Figure 1: Sectoral and Overall GDP growth.
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